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Abstract 
 
This article builds upon archival and oral history research on organizational change at Procter 
& Gamble (P&G) from 1930 to 2000, focusing on periods of transition. It examines historical 
narrative as a vehicle for ideological sensemaking by top managers. Our empirical analysis 
sheds light on continuities in the narratives they offer, through which the past emerges as a 
recurrent lever of strategic manoeuvres and re-orientations. This reveals that while 
organizational history is sometimes regarded as a strategic asset or intrinsic part of collective 
memory, it is also re-enacted as a shared heritage, implying responsibilities. Executives 
(re)interpret the past and author the future, maintaining the historical narrative while using 
interpellation to ensure ideological consistency over time. The interpellative power of 
rhetorical narrative helps to recast organizational members as participants in an ongoing 
drama. In this way executives claim their legitimate right to initiate and manage 
organizational transition.  
 
Keywords: Historical narrative, ideological sensemaking, interpellation, longitudinal 
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Introduction 
This article builds upon archival and oral history research on strategy and organizational 
change at Procter & Gamble (P&G) from 1930 to 2000. We offer a theoretically informed 
longitudinal analysis drawing on executives’ speeches, policy documents, annual reports, 
letters to shareholders, and interviews with business leaders. The focus is on periods of 
organizational transition, with ideological continuities revealed through the invocation of 
stories drawn from the company’s history (Meyer, 1982). In an organization founded in 1837, 
history provides a powerful seam of continuity upon which actors can draw in times of 
turbulence, and which they (re)enact in their daily practices. By adopting a longitudinal 
perspective, and through detailed analysis of company records and oral histories, it is possible 
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to discern deeper shifts in ideology and rhetoric, reflecting parallel shifts in the external 
environment and social context (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001; Pettigrew, 1985).  
 The article demonstrates how stories of character and past achievements are invoked 
at P&G and become pivotal to internal and external communications at times of 
organizational transition, reinvigorating seminal ideas legated by past leaders (Dyer et al., 
2004; Gabriel, 2000; 2004; Pepper, 2005). These stories often focus on enduring principles 
and values, making sense of the constant need for progress while influencing responses to a 
shifting competitive environment (Meyer, 1982). In turbulent environmental contexts, 
making sense of organizational transition in a manner accessible to external and internal 
stakeholders is crucial (Weick, 1995). We show how the set of dominant ideas that have 
framed the organizational ideology of P&G has been nourished and reinterpreted over the 
years, and explore its ability to adapt to new demands.  
Chreim (2005; 2006) has shown how managers tell organizational members narratives 
of change that preserve continuity with the past, demonstrating that the past adds value to the 
change process through the substantiation of sensemaking. Davenport and Leitch (2005: 
1604) have found that strategic ambiguity (Bernheim and Whinston, 1998; Eisenberg, 1984) 
allows managers to promote ‘discursive openness’ or ‘discursive closure’, depending on 
whether they seek ‘engagement with, or compliance from’ stakeholders. Sonenshein (2010) 
clarifies that strategic ambiguity enables managers to accord people a choice between 
interpreting change as narratives of change or as narratives of continuity: those wanting 
change are told stories that suggest this is a desirable outcome, while those favouring 
continuity are placated by references to historical precedents. These accounts do not tell us 
how managers’ role as change agent is justified, how their ‘right to manage’ or initiate 
change is legitimated. A relevant literature here is that of ideology, or self-justificatory 
discourse (Barley and Kunda, 1992; Bendix, 1959; Billig, 1991; Costea et al., 2006; 
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Enteman, 1993; Filby and Willmott, 1988; Simons and Ingram, 1997). Ideology is 
understandably self-reinforcing and defensive, however, so its openness to change is 
problematic.  
The invocation of lessons from the past in storied form provides, we suggest, a 
powerful vehicle for the maintenance of an organizational ideology which centres and renders 
consonant the identity of human subjects within the organization by evoking their ‘active 
consent’ (Clegg, 1989: 160). Narrative is humanizing and gives meaning to processes of time 
and change (Ricoeur, 1984), assuaging fears for the future (Bettelheim, 1975; Brown and 
Humphreys, 2002; Costea et al., 2006; Ybema, 2010). We propose that the role of top 
managers in historical narrativization is to re-enact through storytelling a common heritage, 
evoking a collective past which evokes an ‘idiom of kinship’ or familial belonging (Ricoeur, 
1978: 45, cited in Brown and Humphreys, 2002: 153; Rowlinson and Hassard, 1993). In 
doing so, they (re)interpret the past while ‘authoring’ a shared future (Weick, 1995: 7). By 
ensuring that new ‘chapters’ in the company’s development make ideological sense with the 
old, top executives sustain the narrative while enabling its adaptation. In their role as 
custodians of the integrity of the company’s historical narrative, they claim their legitimate 
right to direct its ongoing saga. 
The literature on management and organization studies is fundamentally ahistorical in 
orientation (Kieser, 1994; Mills et al., 2013; Rowlinson et al., 2010). Business history 
research appears likewise stubbornly resistant to organization theory, giving rise to what 
Braudel has dubbed a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ (Kieser, 1994: 612); although there are signs that 
this is beginning to change (Harvey et al., 2011a; 2011b; Maclean, 2008; Rowlinson and 
Procter, 1999; Taylor et al., 2009). Archivally based historical research is rare in 
organizations studies (Rowlinson and Carter, 2002), where ‘archives are not seen as part of 
an organization’s memory, and business historians are dismissed as being just one among 
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many actors in an organization’s external environment’ (Rowlinson and Hassard, 1993: 301). 
We perceive organizational memory as primarily concerned with the re-enactment of a shared 
historical narrative (Casey and Olivera, 2011; Nissley and Casey, 2002; Rowlinson et al., 
2010; Walsh and Ungson, 1991). This serves a commemorative function, whilst helping to 
regenerate the company through the re-telling of stories and instilling in new recruits 
cherished company values (Brown and Humphreys, 2002). We contribute to the literature on 
‘historical’ storytelling by top managers, which is understudied in organization theory, by 
proposing that historical narrative provides a vehicle for ideological sensemaking by 
executives. Relatively little is known about how such actors actively draw on history to 
support their agendas for change or continuity in the present and future (Hansen, 2007; 
Parker, 2002; Rowlinson and Hassard, 1993; Ybema, 2010). This paper addresses this 
important topic, showing that top managers play an important role in organizational 
sensemaking, maintaining the historical narrative while using interpellation to ensure 
ideological consistency over time (Althusser, 1971; Rennstam, 2012); for a large 
multinational characterized by heteroglossia (Barry and Elmes, 1997), embracing many 
nationalities, such stories make accessible a common language and history. Corporate history 
is a socially constructed process (Booth et al., 2007; Costea et al., 2006; Nissley and Casey, 
2002; Suddaby et al., 2010). Stories provide moral lessons which aim to ‘educate, persuade, 
warn, reassure, justify, explain, and console’ (Gabriel, 2000: 32); reminiscent of stained glass 
windows in medieval cathedrals, which told stories in pictorial form for (illiterate) 
congregations, designed to induce desired interpretations. There is also, as Gabriel (2000: 50) 
observes, ‘a level on which a story, unlike an ideology, cannot be negated’.  
 The article is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on ideology 
and organizational sensemaking. We then provide details of the research on which the study 
is founded. Next we identify key aspects of P&G’s narrative, establishing a platform for the 
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thematic analysis presented in the following section. The ensuing discussion demonstrates the 
important part played by top executives in ideological sensemaking, who draw on the 
narratives of past leaders, accorded a prominent mnemonic role (Casey and Olivera, 2006; 
Feldman and Feldman, 2006; Nissley and Casey, 2002; Rowlinson et al., 2010; Walsh and 
Ungson, 1991), while subtly reframing deep ideological structures in response to shifting 
competitive circumstances (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001).  
 
Ideology and Sensemaking 
‘Man makes his own history’, wrote Marx (1852/1887: 9), ‘but he does not make it out of the 
whole cloth; he does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself… At the very time 
when men appear engaged in revolutionizing things and themselves do they anxiously 
conjure up into their service the spirits of the past, assume their names, their battle cries, their 
costumes to enact a new historic scene in such time-honored disguise and with such borrowed 
language’. Here, Marx highlights the importance of enactment (Weick, 1995), suggesting that 
in taking on the mantle of the past we are prompted to ‘enact a new historic scene’ in ‘time-
honored disguise’ adopting ‘borrowed language’. Brown (1978: 375) explains the 
significance of Marx’s observation: ‘All of us to some degree design or tailor our worlds, but 
we never do this from raw cloth… for the most part we get our worlds ready to wear’ (see 
Creed et al., 2002). 
Organizations, according to Simons and Ingram (1997: 784), are ‘infused with 
ideology’. Yet the concept of ideology in the literature on management and organization 
studies (Alvesson, 1991; Barley and Kunda, 1992; Bendix, 1959; Beyer, 1981; Billig, 1991; 
Costea et al., 2006; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1988; Filby and Willmott, 1988; Meyer, 1982; 
Watson, 1982; Weiss and Miller, 1987) has arguably attracted less attention than more 
fashionable concepts like rhetoric and discourse (Alvesson, 2007; Hardy et al., 2000; Mueller 
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et al., 2003; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Watson, 1995), with which it is nevertheless 
closely related. As Enteman (1993: 8) succinctly puts it, ‘Ideology was born as a rhetorical 
device’. Barley and Kunda’s (1992) study of changing managerial ideologies suggests that 
each change was accompanied by a ‘rhetorical surge’. Costea et al. (2010: 164) agree, 
suggesting that current tensions of ‘growing corporations against a shrinking world…require 
the accelerated renewal of rhetorical resources’. Ideology functions through language which 
is dependent on its social context (Giddens, 1993). It has a key temporal and diachronic 
aspect, giving meaning to time and space: ‘organizational ideologies link the past and the 
future, [and] lend dignity to everyday activities’ (Meyer, 1982: 47). Vaara et al. (2004: 4) 
argue that one reason why we often misunderstand why particular stories gain credence in 
organizations and become institutionalized (Barry and Elmes, 1997), is that we overlook ‘the 
various cultural, historical and ideological elements’ which underpin them. 
Institutionalization implies to ‘infuse with value’ (Selznick, 1957: 17; Suddaby et al., 2013). 
We consider ideology an important lens through which to examine major organizations which 
have withstood the test of time to become quasi-institutions in their own right. 
Bendix (1956: 2) interprets managerial ideologies as ideas ‘espoused by or for those 
who exercise authority in economic enterprises’, which are used to shore up and justify that 
authority. According to this view, ideologies are ‘the legacy of institutions and ideas’ 
bequeathed by one generation to the next (Bendix, 1959: 619), echoing the point made by 
Marx and Brown that our worlds come ‘ready to wear’. This interpretation directs attention to 
the role played by top managers or historical leaders in encouraging the organization to 
cohere around a set of recognized values or principles (while reinforcing their own authority), 
which they transmit to subsequent generations, thus helping to preserve the organization in 
the future. Drawing on Bendix (1959) and Enteman (1993), we define ideology as a set of 
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values and principles infused by an organization’s history which inform and underpin its 
social and economic order in the present and future. 
We draw also on the notion of interpellation, according to which ideology is 
conceived as a ‘representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence’ (Althusser, 1971: 109; Rennstam, 2012). This in itself is insufficient 
to explain ideology’s directive power, however, which requires that individuals foster a 
relationship of their own to that representation to secure commitment to values and strategies; 
‘interpellation’ being required to complete the process. Interpellation refers to the way in 
which an institution appears to speak directly to individuals as subjects, as if calling them by 
name (Althusser, 1971: 118). This sheds light on the power of ideological organizations to 
elicit the personal commitment of employees by ‘transforming organizations into beloved 
institutions’ (Meyer, 1982: 47).  
Our understanding of ideology builds on that of ‘rhetorical history’ advanced by 
Suddaby et al. (2010: 147) to highlight the interpretive function of history as a ‘social and 
rhetorical construction that can be shaped and manipulated to motivate, persuade, and frame 
action’ in order to confer competitive advantage. Informed by Hobsbawm’s (1983) notion of 
invented tradition, which seeks to ‘inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by 
repetition’, Suddaby et al. (2010) conceive of history as a combination of subjective and 
objective reality through which the past may be remoulded and persuasively reinterpreted. 
This re-telling of stories from history in ways which ascribe meaning and favour preferred 
interpretations has an important sensemaking role to play in steering the inferences 
organizational members draw from their present circumstances. Our paper is located within 
this theoretical terrain. Drawing on Suddaby et al.’s (2010) notion of rhetorical history as 
well as Enteman’s (1993) interpretation of ideology as a rhetorical device, we bring a 
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sensemaking perspective to this issue in order to explore the notion of ideological 
sensemaking by top managers through historical narrative.  
While scholars have explored ideology and sensemaking (Brown and Jones, 2000; 
Brown et al., 2008; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Lüscher and Lewis, 2008; Sonenshein, 
2007; Weick, 1988; 1995; Weick et al., 2005) individually and separately, we know much 
less about the conjunction of the two, ideological sensemaking (Prasad and Prasad, 1994; 
Pratt, 2000a). This paper helps to conceptualize this area. Ideological sensemaking implies a 
(perhaps provisional) stabilization of preferred meaning amid organizational transition 
(Bakken and Hernes, 2006; Bergson 1911/2009; Maclean et al., 2012; Sonenshein, 2007; 
Weick, 2009; Weick et al., 2005). This emphasizes the importance of historical narratives for 
making sense of organizational change; and of ideologically infused sensemaking stories as 
offering (reassuring) stability within organizational upheaval, attenuating fear for the future 
(Brown and Humphreys, 2002; Costea et al, 2006). In what follows, we draw on Weick’s 
(1995) theory of organizational sensemaking to explore the role played by top managers in 
ideological sensemaking through historical narrative. 
Sensemaking, for Weick (1995: 4-5), is essentially ‘a thinking process that uses 
retrospective accounts to explain surprises’ (Louis, 1980). When surprise is acute, at times of 
upheaval, inadequate sensemaking may threaten an organization’s survival (Weick, 1988). 
The view of ideology which infuses his theory of organizational sensemaking draws on 
Beyer’s (1981: 33) insight that ideology comprises a ‘shared, relatively coherent interrelated 
set of emotionally charged beliefs, values, and norms that bind some people together and help 
them to make sense of their worlds’ (Weick, 1995: 111). Weick (1993: 33) points to the link 
between sensemaking and ideology when he suggests that organizations with strong sets of 
belief around enactment, crisis prevention and management are better able to cope with crises 
when these occur; suggesting that ‘enactment… might serve as the basis for an ideology of 
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crisis prevention and management’ (Weick, 1988: 315). This emphasizes organizational 
ideology as a resource which managers may exploit to indicate accepted modes of behaviour 
and preferential outcomes, helping the organization to find a way through times of 
turbulence; making ideology a ‘crucial resource for sensemaking’ which is implicated in 
strategizing by top managers (Weick, 1995: 113).  
For Weick (1995: 120; 131), stories are similarly critical for sensemaking, for which 
they form ‘extracted cues’:  
‘Stories are cues within frames that are also capable of creating frames. Ideologies, 
paradigms, and traditions are known by their examples… When people are asked to 
describe their ideology, they start with examples that imply patterns of belief within 
which those examples make sense. Stories that exemplify frames, and frames that 
imply stories, are two basic forms in which the substance of sensemaking becomes 
meaningful’.  
 
Stories assist with organizational wayfinding and enactment in that they ‘posit a history for 
an outcome’, sequencing itself being a ‘source of sense’ (Weick, 1995: 128).  That managers 
can extract from ‘the vast pool of ideological substance that smaller portion that matters’ 
(Weick, 1995: 112) enables the selection of stories with ideological fit with the historical 
narrative, designed to induce ‘voluntary cooperation’ (Meyer, 1982: 55, cited in Weick, 1995: 
113). However, where top managers are on occasion found wanting in Weick’s (1995: 127) 
eyes is that their skills lie in argumentation rather than narration. In an organizational world 
that is increasingly ‘text laden’ (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005: 61), where organizational 
reality is dependent on narration, being ‘talked into existence’ (Weick, 2009: 4; Bakken and 
Hernes, 2006), their sensemaking and storytelling skills are often deficient. This creates 
considerable potential for ‘incomprehension at the top’ which is directly attributable to 
imperfect sensemaking by managers, often in situations of ‘high ambiguity and high arousal’ 
(Weick, 1995: 116); fostering poor judgment and flawed decision-making. This matters, 
because ‘it is the later stages of decision making, positions along the chain of means-ends 
 10 
connection, where judgment, and whatever has controlled it, affect the sense an organization 
makes’ (Weick, 1995: 115). This leads him to argue that managerial incomprehension 
deriving from defective sensemaking has left top management with little to do, effectively 
redundant. Given this, he ventures to propose, perhaps tongue-in-cheek, that a logical course 
of action would be to eliminate top management altogether:  
‘the best organizational design is to do away with the top-management team. Because 
the organization makes sense, literally and figuratively, at the bottom, that is all the 
design that is necessary. Current organizational forms embodying teams, lateral 
structures, and dynamic networks seem to embody this lesson.’ (Weick, 1995: 117) 
 
This suggestion challenges the notion that top managers play a critical role in 
espousing and perpetuating ideologies founded on a coherent set of recognized beliefs and 
values which they legate to subsequent generations to help ensure continuity (Bendix, 1959; 
Enteman, 1993). Other commentators have stressed the need for a more critical examination 
of some of Weick’s more unorthodox claims (Basbøll, 2010: 163; Basbøll and Graham, 2006; 
Booth et al., 2007). In this paper, we therefore take to task his theoretical prescription to do 
away with top management, our research into organizational transition at P&G having led us 
to a very different conclusion. We find, conversely, that historically top managers have 
played a critical sensemaking role at P&G, where making sense of the past emerges as a sine 
qua non for understanding the present and future (Costea et al., 2006), implying a 
crystallization of meaning which serves as a spur to future action (Sonenshein, 2007; Weick, 
1988; Weick et al., 2005). The sensemaking literature traditionally has accepted the need for 
an element of sensebreaking, following the proposition that you have to devalue the past to 
induce a sense of urgency and momentum for change (Pratt, 2000b). As Meyer (1982: 60) 
asserts, ‘Impending crises may become auspicious occasions for updating antiquated 
ideologies and elaborating time-worn stories’. The implication is that a particular policy, 
however sacrosanct, may be recalibrated or jettisoned to obviate a crisis or help the 
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organization navigate what its leaders deem to be a desirable transition. There is nevertheless 
a caveat. The (re)constructed narrative should make sense to organizational members, and, 
allied to this, the company’s new direction should have ideological ‘fit’ with the old; since 
new strategic narratives may founder when ‘they have been unwittingly tailored in the wrong 
cloth’ (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 436). 
 
Research Foundations 
Our research is founded upon privileged access to selected document classes within P&G’s 
corporate archives, established in 1957, held at its headquarters in Cincinnati. Access was 
negotiated directly (by email and telephone) with the corporate archivist to materials relating 
to strategy, internationalization and organizational change. Annual reports and accounts, 
internal and external executive communications, oral histories, executive biographies, 
company magazines and a variety of other materials were consulted. We were aware of the 
‘ideological hegemony’ (Brown and Humphreys, 2002) which pervaded the ambiance and the 
asymmetrical power relations which characterized our visit and status as privileged 
academics who must nevertheless remain within defined limits in conducting archival 
searches. At the same time, we were conscious of the need to act with integrity as 
organizational historians (Booth et al., 2007). Dellheim (1986: 16) diagnoses the nature of the 
tension we experienced as researchers:  
‘there is the risk that the historian may become little better than an archival hired-gun 
fighting a rearguard action armed with index cards. And it is no less certain that such 
behaviour would incur the outrage of professional colleagues who would, with reason, 
call into question the integrity of the offender. Yet one can hardly blame corporations 
for their reticence to welcome potential scholarly muckrakers with secret agendas’.  
 
That our research was historical in nature was arguably reassuring to the corporate 
archivist. Accessing an organization’s recorded history, as Rowlinson and Hassard (1993) 
explain, illuminates the past as organizational members choose to remember it. We selected 
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P&G as an ideal case study company, being a large, diverse organization with a long history 
which has experienced episodic strategic change on a major scale, yet which has been the 
subject of relatively few in-depth academic studies (Denison and Mishra, 1995; Dodgson et 
al., 2006; Dyer et al., 2004). During the research visit made by two of the researchers, the 
archives team provided assistance in locating and copying documents. Extensive data were 
gathered covering the period from 1930, when descendents of the founding families ceased to 
act as managers, to the new millennium, when P&G emerged as a global player in fast-
moving branded consumer goods. A summary of the primary sources collected by the 
research team is provided in the Appendix.  
 Extensive oral history interviews conducted by the P&G archivist with former senior 
executives in the 1990s proved especially valuable. The interviewees knew several of the 
company’s ‘great men’ personally, having risen through its ranks to assume top positions. 
Their accounts reveal inter alia how they learned directly from their predecessors and 
bequeathed this learning in turn, passing on the baton of P&G’s heritage over decades 
(Feldman and Feldman, 2006). The oral-history interviews were complemented by six 
additional interviews conducted by members of the research team as the opportunity arose 
from 2008 to 2011 with former and current P&G executives and managers, each interview 
lasting approximately 90 minutes, and all of which were recorded and transcribed. The 
interviews were used to corroborate insights which emerged from the archival data. 
 On return from Cincinnati, all documents were categorized according to their subject 
and purpose. Through reading and re-reading the historical record, our attention was drawn to 
the preponderance of documents, often executive speeches and letters to shareholders, 
relating to ideas, values, beliefs and the ‘character’ of the company; in short, what made it 
special to the P&G community. It appeared that P&G had made a conscious effort to 
articulate and codify this. This insight led to the decision to focus on these documents. In 
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doing so, and through further reading of the data, we became increasingly aware of the overt 
use of historical narrative as a means of conveying lessons to the wider P&G community, 
including internal and external stakeholders, whereby the historical narrative became a 
vehicle for a form of moral storytelling which seemed to invite organizational members to 
live up to the past, accentuating the ‘bringing forth of memory’ as a critical aspect of the 
sensemaking process (Schultz and Hernes, 2012: 4; Whittle and Mueller, 2012). Further 
scrutiny of the historical record uncovered a number of recurring themes or leitmotifs, which 
emerged as categories, according to which we coded our data (Berg, 2009). These include the 
inseparability of interests between company and employees; an emphasis on the character of 
the company; the importance of doing the right thing; promotion from within; the insistence 
on growth, followed by the slowing of recruitment in the harsher competitive environment of 
the 1990s.  
  
Narratives and Memory at P&G 
Boje (2008) highlights the importance of writing to collective memory in formal 
organizations. Schultz and Hernes (2013) likewise place emphasis on the textual memory of 
organizations, which fosters a certain stability of meaning. Traditionally, executive speeches 
at P&G are carefully crafted in advance, not given off the cuff. Considerable attention has 
been paid to memo writing. O.B. Butler, Vice Chairman of the Board under CEO Neil 
McElroy (1948-1957), stresses the significance of ‘the written word’ for P&G over time:  
‘One of the tremendous strengths of Procter & Gamble throughout history at least, 
was the absolute requirement that decisions be based on the written word not the 
spoken word. A tremendous amount of training we did was to require people to write 
things down, to sharpen their focus, to write things in very brief form…’ (P&GCA, 
1994b). 
 
This was confirmed at interview by a former employee, a first-level supervisor at P&G in the 
1950s, who underscored the importance of the ‘very concise half page memo’, adding ‘the 
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man above you couldn’t stop it – it was all about getting information to rise, it had to go up’ 
(Interviewee A, 2008). The former CEO of a P&G subsidiary in the 1990s agreed: ‘The 
shorter your presentation the more successful you were likely to be…brilliant device, the one 
page memo’ (Interviewee C, 2011). At times this might entail being required to redraft a 
memo; Pepper (2005), CEO from 1995 to 1998, recalls having to rewrite one four times. The 
upshot of this attention to concise expression is a written textual record of all significant 
company events and a common language amongst employees (Denison and Mishra, 1995). 
The importance accorded to written texts at P&G means that a rare, coherent body of 
documentary evidence exists to scrutinize the historical record over several generations 
(McPhee, 2004; Vaara et al., 2004); albeit that the company has approved these texts in 
advance of any scrutiny, company archives often being constructed with the goal of 
enhancing corporate reputations vis-à-vis external stakeholders (Booth et al., 2007). 
For Boje (2008: 81), drawing on Halbwachs (1950), the storytelling organization is ‘a 
tapestry of multiple interacting, interpenetrating collective memories of members of various 
groups’. Ricoeur (1984: 80) argues that written texts in combination create worlds: ‘To 
understand these texts is to interpolate among the predicates of our situation all those 
meanings that… make a world’. The story of P&G is deeply enmeshed with the growth of the 
modern consumer economy. In what follows, we consider key aspects of P&G’s history as ‘a 
set of stories which [re]construct the past’ (Parker, 2002: 589), which are used to inform our 
subsequent thematic analysis. These stories are propagated by managers and used to direct 
behaviour in the present and future, providing cues or ‘“grammars” that help actors… draw 
causal maps whereby their past experiences guide their future actions’ (Bakken and Hernes, 
2006: 1605). These include the beginnings of P&G; the influence of William Cooper Procter 
on its evolving values; the development of Tide, the first synthetic detergent; and the story of 
P&G’s internationalization. 
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Beginnings: from Cholera to Cholera 
To commemorate its 175th anniversary in 2012, P&G displayed on its company website a 
number of stories, including that of William Procter’s journey to Cincinnati. This tells how 
Procter travelled from London to the new world in the 1830s after his woollen shop was 
destroyed by fire and ransacked. A letter written by Procter’s father, featured on the website, 
articulates the lesson he recommends his son extract from his tribulations:  
‘An old sailor that has split upon a sunk rock and has lost his ship is not the worst 
man to make a pilot of; on the contrary he is particularly able to guide those that come 
after, to shun the dangers of that unhappy plan’. (P&GCW, 2012a) 
  
Travelling down the Ohio River, William’s wife, Martha, contracted cholera and died. 
Too exhausted to venture further, he remained in Cincinnati, found work in a bank, and 
remarried, going into business with his new brother-in-law, James Gamble, a soap and candle 
maker. In the fledgling operation, Procter took charge of the office and Gamble of 
production. Almost 170 years later, the Newcastle laboratory of P&G developed a major 
innovation in its water purification product ‘PUR sachet’, which makes dirty water drinkable 
(Dodgson et al., 2006): 
‘How remarkable – and inspiring – that the small soap and candle company the 
grieving William Procter would soon form would one day devote significant energy 
and resources toward preventing the very disease that claimed the life of his wife’. 
(P&GCW, 2012b) 
 
In this story, the development of PUR sachet casts the earlier tragedy of Martha’s 
death from cholera in a new light, reinterpreted as highlighting a problem which the 
organization would address and remedy in the fullness of time (Schultz and Hernes, 2013). 
P&G is presented in a morally advantageous light as attentive to world health issues: ‘it’s a 
story that deepens the roots of our resolve to improve more lives caught in the crosshairs of 
cholera’ (P&GCW, 2012b). The cholera story offers a new perspective on an existing 
narrative, which is refreshed in the process (Barry and Elmes, 1997). This extract from the 
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corporate webpages makes explicit the pertinence of the company’s history to its present, 
‘generating action by linking events in the past to current and future action’ (Suddaby et al., 
2010: 158), as one senior executive explained:  
‘We’ve gone from suffering from cholera to preventing cholera. The purified water 
program was used in Haiti recently to actually tackle the cholera epidemic… 
Increasingly now we are using stories from the past to illuminate the present... There 
are a lot of people who’ve been here five years or less and don’t know the history, the 
institutional memory isn’t there; so, trying to use the archives, stories from the past, 
helps.’ (Interviewee B, 2011) 
 
This excerpt exemplifies the manner in which P&G is proactively ‘using stories from the past 
to illuminate the present’, identifying stories from its archives which are used for 
sensemaking purposes to initiate new recruits into the history and, importantly, values of the 
firm. 
 
William Cooper Procter: Putting Employees First 
Organizational history, as Booth et al. (2007) observe, is often founder centred. Although not 
strictly speaking a founder himself, William Cooper Procter, grandson of William Procter, is 
accorded particular attention in company documentation. Cooper Procter began his 
apprenticeship in 1883 on the shop floor. The move to mass production in the 1880s required 
that workers at Ivorydale, the company’s soap manufacturing facility outside Cincinnati, 
adopt new working practices, leading in 1886 to walkouts and work stoppages (Dyer et al., 
2004). At a time when better-off Americans were increasingly anxious about social upheaval, 
with strikes becoming commonplace, it made sense for owner-managers to embrace the logic 
of industrial improvement (Barley and Kunda, 1992). Cooper Procter, who became general 
manager in 1890 and later served as president (1907-30), reputedly left ‘an enduring mark’ 
on P&G as a reformer, fostering a collective understanding of the business among employees 
(Dyer et al., 2004: 45). Weick (1988: 315) regards commitment as open to manipulation, and 
Cooper Procter worked hard to strengthen worker loyalty, persuading the partners to allow 
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employees Saturday afternoons off and initiate a profit-sharing scheme to instil a sense of 
ownership. The profit scheme he launched placed the company at the forefront of ‘welfare 
capitalism’ (Dyer et al., 2004: 46). A sickness-disability programme for workers was 
established in 1915, followed by an eight-hour working day in 1918. The first African 
American was recruited in 1901, and the first women graduates in 1920. In 1930, being 
childless, Cooper Procter ceded the management of P&G to R.R. Deupree (CEO 1930-48) 
whom he persuaded in 1932 to introduce a five-day, 40-hour working week, convinced of the 
‘inseparability of interests’ between the company and its workforce (P&GCA, 2010). This 
was a lesson Deupree embraced, stating in 1955: ‘William Procter and James Gamble 
realized that the interests of the organization and its employees were inseparable, and the 
partners saw to it that that belief was transmitted to their successors’ (P&GCA, 1976).  
When Cooper Procter died in 1934, a memorial erected at Ivorydale was funded by 
employees. He remains one of the most admired of the company’s forebears. Stories of his 
endeavours centre on the transmission of P&G’s principles and heritage to employees. They 
construct a symbolic world, supporting Rowlinson and Hassard’s (1993: 322) observation 
that history is inherently bound up with institutionalization, whereby: ‘Founders themselves, 
and the act of founding, are institutionalized by history’.   
 
Innovation: The Story of Tide 
The story of the development of Tide, the first synthetic washing power, is illuminating, 
exemplifying the type of ‘compelling story’ identified by Suddaby et al. (2010: 156), invested 
with the power to ‘unlock the historical value in a brand’. Its advent coincided with the 
arrival of automatic washing machines. The official story as to how it was developed is told 
in Dyer et al. (2004). From 1931, P&G had sought to develop the world’s first synthetic 
detergent, unsuccessfully. During the war years, a maverick researcher, David ‘Dick’ Byerly, 
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worked indefatigably on the development of ‘Product X’, without official sanction, such that 
Product X became ‘an officially unofficial skunk works project’ (Dyer et al., 2004: 72). The 
breakthrough came when Byerly counter-intuitively reversed the builder-surfactant ratios 
with which he had been experimenting. Thus, according to the dominant story (Hansen, 2007; 
Pemer and Näslund, 2012), Tide emerged from ‘an R& D structure that allowed room for 
individual initiative, experimentation and serendipity’ (Dyer et al., 2004: 83), where 
individuals could learn from their mistakes; a story which implies that P&G is not unaware of 
the ‘competitive advantages of “applied history”’ (Suddaby et al., 2010: 156). 
There is a counter-narrative, however, which tells a different story, illustrating 
Parker’s (2002) point that history may be contested. According to this, the patent for 
synthetic detergent may have been obtained from the German company Henkel after World 
War II. This is implied by the account offered by former Executive Vice President Walter L. 
‘Jake’ Lingle: 
‘The Henkel Company was and still is (I think) the largest soap and detergent 
company in Germany, [and] had been highly successful with their soap product Persil. 
Then Mr, Henkel, who was then head of the company… was afraid someone would 
invent a synthetic detergent which might damage the Persil position. So he said let us 
invent a synthetic detergent and patent it so someone else can’t introduce it against 
our soap Persil. They successfully developed the first detergent. It was based on 
coconut oil. Since they didn’t want to sell it in Germany, they decided to sell their 
patent rights outside of Germany. They picked Procter & Gamble in the United 
States… I think what happened was that the Henkel patents covered only coconut-oil 
based products. I believe that somebody else developed the petroleum based product, 
which got around the Henkel patents’. (P&GCA, 1993) 
 
This competing narrative suggests that the development of Tide may owe more to Henkel 
than is fully recognized in the official story. If this were accurate, then the dominant story of 
the invention of Tide would serve as a convenient narrative veil, illustrative of the manner in 
which organizations may choose to downplay aspects of their historical narrative, which are 
sidelined in the process (Barry and Elmes, 1997; Booth et al., 2009; Gabriel, 2004).  
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Internationalization: European expansion 
From the 1950s onwards, P&G grew into a multinational enterprise through a combination of 
new-build foreign direct investment and acquisition, evolving progressively from a US 
company with limited international sales operations to a global company. One surprising 
aspect of P&G’s expansion into continental Europe, however, is that did not begin with a 
‘grand plan’, but conversely with Lingle, then head of foreign business, deciding in 1954 that 
one young manager should take over a soap company in France. As T.C. Bower relates: 
‘Jake asked me to take over the French company. Well there again, a fascinating 
story. He turned around to me and said, you and I have gotten along pretty well and 
you’ve done a good job in sales, I have a new job for you. I want you to run a 
company in France. And I said, I didn’t know we had a company in France. And he 
said, we don’t, but I want you to go over and run it. That’s how I was invited to take 
over the French company. And I’m not kidding. I landed in Paris with a Canadian, 
two Americans, a Frenchman and myself. I remember sitting in the so-called office, 
which was an apartment we rented, and I said, there were 55 million French and there 
are 5 of us and we are going to run a business, so you better pray hard as well’. 
(P&GCA, 1994c) 
 
This story reveals P&G’s international expansion as more haphazard than might be 
expected, challenging our perception as to how strategy is conceived and enacted in practice 
(Barry and Elmes, 1997). It supports Weick’s (1983: 48, cited in Basbøll and Graham, 2006: 
200) observation that planning ‘isn’t nearly as crucial for productive action as people think it 
is’. It uncovers a more human aspect of the organization, as initiating international operations 
by a process of trial and error rather than conceiving and following a strategic master plan; a 
key tenet of the Strategy as Practice school of thought (Whittington, 1996). Being without a 
‘map’ to follow, Bower and his colleagues had little choice but to roll up their sleeves and get 
on with it, navigating unfamiliar territory by dint of improvisation and their own practical 
competences, built up during a lengthy apprenticeship at P&G (Basbøll and Graham, 2006; 
Weick, 2006; Whittington, 1996). 
 
Sensemaking and Ideology in Historical Perspective 
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Thematic analysis of the archival record reveals a set of dominant ideas which pervade 
company documentation from an early stage in its history, and which work to strengthen the 
employment contract, serving as signposts to guide behaviour. These include the 
inseparability of interests between company and workforce, the emphasis on character, the 
mantra of doing the right thing, and the importance of promoting from within. However, from 
1990 these principles appear increasingly at odds with a perceived need to accelerate growth 
while slowing the expansion of the workforce. This introduces a competing logic pertaining 
to slowing of recruitment, after which ‘doing the right thing’ becomes associated with 
exercising constrained compassion in handling redundancies, euphemistically dubbed 
‘separation’ (Reay and Hinings, 2009). In the extracts which follow, senior executives return 
to previous statements by their predecessors to voice in propria persona selected points 
drawn from the company’s history. 
 
Inseparability of Interests 
The quintessential importance of the company’s people runs as a common thread throughout 
P&G documentation, the superiority of personnel systems founded on cooperation rather than 
conflict having been grasped early in its history (Barley and Kunda, 1992). As Deupree is 
attributed as saying, ‘the only thing that matters is people… if you were to take away all of 
our money and all of our factories and all of our brands, and leave me all of our people, I 
could build you a new company as big as the one we had today in ten years’ (P&GCA, 
1994b).  
A key aspect of putting people first relates to the inseparability of interests between 
company and employees advocated by Cooper Procter. This translated into significant 
welfare benefits for staff, including the company’s flagship profit-sharing scheme. In 1954, 
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McElroy (1948-57) highlighted the key importance of the scheme as a means of attracting 
and retaining talented staff:  
‘[I]n order to get and keep good men, we must be able to offer not only reasonable 
salaries, but in keeping with these days of high taxation, other plans helpful to 
employees toward creating funds available to them in the latter part of their lives.’ 
(P&GCA, 1954) 
 
McElroy’s successor, Howard Morgens (1957-74), echoes this point, asserting that the ‘task 
of developing people… receives closer attention than any other single phase of the 
Company’s activities and properly so’ (P&GCA, 1959). The attention paid to putting people 
first by consecutive CEOs sets a pattern in the narratives they offer, instilling a ‘tradition of 
conduct’ (Weick, 1995: 126). 
 
The Character of the Company 
The role played by successive leaders in articulating the values legated by the company’s 
founders is apparent in the documentary record. According to Cooper Procter, the standards 
instilled in P&G by its founders were bequeathed to those who followed as a ‘spiritual 
inheritance’ (P&GCA, 1976). Deupree, said to have known all former leaders personally (bar 
the founders) as well as his three immediate successors, played a lynchpin role in 
‘transmitting that unchanging belief in the inseparability of the interests of the Company and 
its employees’ (P&GCA, 1976), in the manner highlighted by Feldman and Feldman (2006). 
Morgens reputedly regarded Deupree as a ‘father adviser’ whom he regularly consulted even 
after retirement (P&GCA, 1994a). 
 In 1960, Lingle reflected upon the character of the company in a speech which the 
head archivist described during our visit as ‘one of the speeches that … gets pulled out of the 
files most here in Archives’. If, as Weick (1995: 114) suggests, ‘influences on sensemaking 
are often implicit, tacit, preconscious, mindless, and taken for granted’, then this speech may 
be understood as a first conscious attempt to document and render explicit what the P&G 
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character actually comprised. Lingle stressed ‘thoroughness and self-discipline’ as a 
dominant trait and emphasized that ‘individual responsibility is Bible’, while highlighting the 
firm’s philosophy of guaranteed employment (P&GCA, 1960). In 1969, Morgens’ 
presidential statement cited previous statements by former leaders, including the following 
from Cooper Procter concerning the company character:  
‘The reputation and character, standards and ideals of The Procter & Gamble 
Company are not the creation of any one man but had their inception with the 
founders of the Company nearly a century ago. They are standards and ideals of 
honesty and justice and concern in dealing with its people. It has been the good 
fortune of the Company that the foundation laid by those founders was broadened and 
deepened by those who followed them.’ (P&GCA, 1969) 
 
Here, Cooper Procter points to the role played by managers in ‘broadening and deepening’ 
the values promoted by the company’s founders – not only preserving these but adding to and 
interpreting the narrative in their own right. He depicts the company as one which looks to 
the past to build the qualities required in the future (Schultz and Hernes, 2013). These, he 
argues, concern character, which finds expression in the way employees conduct themselves 
on a daily basis, exhibiting ‘honesty and justice and concern in dealing with… people’. 
McElroy echoed this point in 1957, his words again reiterated by Morgens 12 years later: 
 ‘The Company rates character in its people higher than any other single quality. We 
are raised in that tradition and we are trained to perpetuate it … We have simply 
become convinced through the years that our Company moves forward better and is 
more successful with people who respect one another and have in common high 
standards of responsibility to each other, to their families and to their communities.’ 
(P&GCA, 1969) 
 
In the above excerpt, McElroy can be seen to pass the baton from his forerunner, Cooper 
Procter, to Morgens his successor, underlining the role of CEOs as transmitters of perennial 
values, like links in a chain (Feldman and Feldman, 2006). 
  
Doing the Right Thing 
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The character of the company and its employees finds expression in the mantra of doing the 
right thing; as Ed Harness (CEO 1974-81) stated in 1976, borrowing from a speech delivered 
by Howard Morgens (P&GCA, 1973), ‘doing the right thing at all times – not what is 
expedient but what is right’ (P&GCA, 1976). This had been similarly articulated in Lingle’s 
exposé of the company character, which states: ‘We act from a moral position which is even 
stricter and more demanding than the letter or the spirit of the laws themselves’ (P&GCA, 
1960). In 1995, John Pepper listed nine points which together accounted for P&G’s 
consistent success over the years. Fourth on the list was the importance of ‘doing the right 
thing, described as one of P&G’s ‘timeless values… rooted in the early beliefs of the 
founders and subsequent family members’ (P&GCA, 1995). The company’s moral integrity 
is held as a guarantee that there will be no ‘loss of mission’ in the future (Brown and 
Humphreys, 2002: 149); as Harness explained, ‘the basic course of the Company will be 
maintained because our principles and our practice – our character – will not radically 
change’ (P&GCA, 1976). 
 
Promotion from Within 
Closely allied to the inseparability of interests and the importance of character is the 
longstanding policy of promotion from within. While more recently top executives have been 
recruited from outside the P&G stable, including from leading competitors like Unilever, 
during our period of study this was not the case. A policy of promoting insiders capitalized 
on the extended apprenticeship on offer at P&G. Its advantages were enumerated by Howard 
Morgens in 1962, his explanation being recycled seven years later: 
‘We are a company that doesn’t hire executives from outside. We develop them – 
from within. Practically everyone in Procter & Gamble today has spent his entire life 
with the Company. This has produced people of outstanding ability in all parts of our 
business.’ (P&GCA, 1969) 
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Promotion from within helped to ensure that only committed employees, recognized 
as authentic ‘P&Gers’, were promoted to managerial positions (P&GCA, 1960). This 
underlines the connection between individuals’ sense of who they are and their understanding 
of the organization to which they ‘belong’ (Hansen, 2007). The character of the company, 
which Harness describes as ‘the underlying asset which holds us together in times of change 
or stress’, has what he terms an ‘inner face’, turned towards employees, as well as an ‘outer 
face’, directed at external stakeholders and customers (P&GCA, 1976). Acceptance of the 
inner face is seen as a prerequisite to a successful career at P&G: ‘no one has ever reached 
the top of the Company without adequate opportunity to judge our inner face and to accept 
it… no one has ever reached the top without being judged by superiors who believed in and 
operated by its principles and practice’ (P&GCA, 1976). The importance of accepting this 
inner face highlights the internalization of company processes and procedures as a condition 
of institutional membership, emphasizing familial resemblance as a key criterion for 
advancement and institutional belonging (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Filby and Willmott, 
1988). 
 
Growth and Recruitment 
Simons and Ingram (1997: 788) observe that ‘recognizing the adjustment of ideology to 
behaviour necessitated by other influences is fundamental to understanding the evolution of 
organizations’ ideologies’. The adjustment of ideology to a harsher competitive environment 
became apparent from 1990. At P&G, growth had consistently been top priority, doubling the 
business every ten years having been a target since the time of Deupree, as emphasized by 
O.B. Butler:  
‘We will double our business every 10 years… This was Deupree’s. I don’t know if it 
went back to William Cooper Procter, but it certainly went back to Deupree.’ 
(P&GCA, 1994b) 
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The entire history of the company from its founding until 1987 had been premised on 
prioritizing the long term (P&GCA, 1987a). CEO John Smale’s remarks to shareholders in 
the company’s 150th anniversary year reveal this to be a deeply held policy: 
‘I believe that by focusing on the short term and considering only the immediate 
rewards to shareholders, our publicly-held businesses will see their competitive 
position decay, their resiliency in difficult times undermined, and their standing in our 
society compromised. I believe the history of Procter & Gamble exemplifies the 
benefits of the opposite approach.’ (P&GCA, 1987b) 
 
However, pressure from the financial markets caused the company to assume short-
term commitments in the form of three-year profits and market share targets. Smale attributed 
the change in policy to the evolving business environment: ‘our profit performance has not 
been adequate. You’ll recall that in 1984-5 we, for the first time in over 30 years, failed to 
achieve an earnings gain on the previous year’ (P&GCA, 1988).  In reorienting policy away 
from the long term, history is invoked by the key phrase ‘for the first time in over 30 years’, 
justifying change paradoxically by reference to historical continuity.  
From 1990, reference to growth in company statements became more overtly linked 
to personnel policies; the imperative ‘to get and to keep good men’ promoted by McElroy in 
1952 presented now as a prerequisite for growth. This was made explicit by Ed Artzt (CEO 
1990-95): ‘Recruiting, developing and retaining the best people will be a major priority for 
all P&G managers so we can meet growth projections in the coming decade’ (P&GCA, 
1990). The more challenging competitive environment prompted the decision to take a hard 
look at company values, leading to a renewal of purpose, values and principles conducted by 
CEO Pepper in the mid-1990s. This reappraisal of the company’s ethos led to new values 
being articulated, including a shared passion for winning. Growth became a more insistent 
refrain in company literature. Pepper and Jager’s joint address to shareholders in October 
1998 identified ‘unprecedented opportunities for growth’ together with a perceived need ‘to 
grow this business faster’ (P&GCA, 1998a).  
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At the same time, a hiatus was beginning to open up in the ideological sensemaking 
being made by company executives, the rationale of being ‘people-oriented’ in all things 
(P&GCA, 1976) appearing increasingly at variance with the expressed need to slow the rate 
at which the workforce was expanding (Reay and Hinings, 2009). In practice, this meant 
restructuring and downsizing. Faced with such difficulties, P&G employees are described as 
responding like ‘P&G people… courageously committed’ (P&GCA, 1994d). This hiatus 
nevertheless called into question the presumption of shared interests, impacting on employee 
attitudes and relations (Hansen, 2007). Dean Fite noted that workers were ‘not there at 8.30 in 
the morning. They come in at 9.00 or 9.30 and so on…There is not the loyalty to the 
Company today that existed back in the ‘40’s and ‘50’s and ‘60’s’ (P&GCA, 1994a). A 
former employee confirmed that ‘collegiality vanished… the company went from being 
bottom up to top down’ (Interviewee A, 2008). 
Throughout this time, growth, and the acceleration of growth (‘growing our business 
faster’ (P&GCA, 1998b)), remained key objectives, managers holding true to their specified 
goal of doubling the business each decade. The worsening economic environment 
nevertheless prompted a ‘politicised process of reality [re]construction’ (Ybema, 2010: 496). 
This led in 1998 to a joint address to shareholders by Pepper and Jager (CEO 1999-2000), 
announcing ‘the most far-reaching set of changes in the history of P&G’ (P&GCA, 1998a). 
By 1999, with cost-cutting imperatives and the need to re-ignite growth high on executive 
agendas, a ‘reduction in enrolment’, as Pepper (2005: 154) expresses it, was deemed 
necessary. The use of the term ‘enrolment’ here is striking, denoting recruitment to a club or 
institution. It is indeed as an institution that P&G was increasingly presented, ‘an institution 
and community’ (P&GCA, 2003), institutions, Pepper (2005: 2) claims, being better able to 
renew themselves.  
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This was accompanied by a restructuring programme designed to ‘drive costs to best-
in-class levels, rationalize our manufacturing capacity, and address underperforming 
businesses’ (P&GCA, 2001). The 2002 Annual Report (P&GCA, 2002) mentions 16,600 
‘separation packages’ negotiated with employees, mainly from the US, who took redundancy 
from 1999 to 2002. Weick (1995: 117) claims that typical US organizational ideologies based 
on competitive advantage, ethnocentrism and individualism were ill suited to ‘the internal 
contingencies left behind by downsizing nor [were they] sufficiently general to make sense 
on a global scale’. Addressing these challenges, Pepper (2005: 154) draws strength from 
Deupree’s exhortation 50 years previously to ‘do the right thing’, adding ‘there is no way 
anyone could do what’s right without taking on such decisions’. The meaning of ‘doing the 
right thing’ in this context is reinterpreted to embrace handling redundancies (although this 
word is not used) sensitively. To shed jobs strikes at the heart of how executives conceive of 
P&G as a company whose interests cannot be separated from those of its employees, 
exemplifying what Barry and Elmes (1997: 447) refer to as ‘deauthorizing’, gainsaying the 
original narrative. Speculating how he would tackle such difficulties were he still CEO, 
Pepper defers to Cooper Procter: 
 I have a picture of William Cooper Procter in my office. I’ve looked at it often in 
recent years as I pondered a tough decision, and asked myself, what would he have 
done? (Pepper, 2005: 275). 
 
Pepper’s search for answers in the portrait of a revered former leader recalls Marx’s 
(1852/1887) insight that, in enacting change, leaders assume the costumes of paragons from 
the past. The picture serves as a mirror, projecting desired characteristics on which Pepper 
wishes to draw, offering reassurance (Brown and Humphreys, 2002); while the question 
‘what would he have done?’ represents an interesting abrogation of responsibility. Overt 
recourse to company forebears helps executives to present thorny issues as seemingly 
consistent with traditional values (Ybema, 2010). This turnaround in attitude towards 
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employment nevertheless presaged the large-scale outsourcing and off-shoring of jobs from 
the US to (cheaper) locations globally. The domestic controversies these inevitably provoked 
are glossed over in executives’ accounts. Dictated by the logics of cost-cutting and the 
maximization of shareholder value, outsourcing production was difficult to reconcile with the 
enduring narrative and longstanding imperative of putting people first (Creed et al., 2002; 
Hollinshead and Park, 2011; Reay and Hinings, 2009). 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The P&G executives on whose statements this article has focused are themselves dyed-in-the-
wool ‘P&Gers’ whose organizational worlds have come ‘ready to wear’ (Brown, 1978: 375). 
In assuming the costumes and battle cries of their predecessors (Marx, 1852/1887), they 
demonstrate their credentials as guardians of a shared heritage, thus claiming their legitimate 
right to direct and manage organizational change. Our research reveals that recourse to 
historical narrative during transition became second nature at P&G: ‘Like arguing on case 
law in a court, you referred back to these stories and then people were reminded how P&G 
had done it then’ (Interviewee C, 2011). Executives are in a strong position to influence 
social reality by controlling the ‘rules of relevance’ (Brown, 1978: 376; Maclean et al., 2006), 
choosing which elements to foreground or edit; the archives themselves housing pre-selected 
documents (Booth et al., 2007; Casey and Olivera, 2011; Nissley and Casey, 2002; 
Rowlinson et al., 2010). In their role as spokespersons for the P&G community, top managers 
are called upon to (re)formulate ‘what they sense to be its shared understandings’ (Watson, 
1982: 264). In this sense, their speeches are to a degree scripted in advance, conditioned by 
powerful pre-existing institutional logics emanating from P&G’s history (Creed et al., 2002; 
Seo and Creed, 2002); but top managers also share responsibility for reinterpreting the past as 
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needed and authoring a new, common future which the workforce can buy into (Maclean et 
al., 2007).  
While conflicting logics, such as emerged when the principle of lifetime employment 
was revised, might be seen as sources of deinstitutionalization and change (Reay and 
Hinings, 2009), our paper reveals that there was little loss of legitimacy at P&G when logics 
conflicted. On the contrary, when this occurs there are other positive logics which bolster and 
conceal the negative logic, such as living up to the heroes of the past, or which recast the 
negative logic in a more positive light, such as the P&G community responding courageously 
to restructuring. This suggests that conflicting logics do not induce destabilization and change 
as we might expect. This may be due to ideological sensemaking by executives through 
historical narrative providing a reassuring cushion from ongoing transition. As Weick (1995: 
120) states, ‘the gaps between exemplars in a paradigm may provide the slack that enables 
people who disagree to maintain the perception that there is a consensus’, accommodating 
different meanings. This enables account makers at P&G to manage the tension between its 
focus on durable meaning, especially character and people, and other systems of meaning, 
like the need to downsize, so that while labels stay the same, meanings may undergo subtle 
but significant change (Eisenberg, 1984; Gioia et al, 2000).  
A further way in which executives manage the dialectic of lived contradictions, 
whereby some systems of meaning endorse the status quo whilst others legitimize its 
adaptation (Seo and Creed, 2002), is through the interpellative power of rhetorical narrative 
(Rennstam, 2012), whereby individuals are personally interpellated in a manner which 
requires something of them, instilling personal responsibility. This is most apparent when 
executives make speeches and statements targeting key internal stakeholders, including 
employees and top managers (in relationship with past and future generations of top 
managers), and require their best efforts. On one occasion, Pepper speculates how a typical 
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employee might experience working life, saying: ‘I’m glad I found P&G. I can’t imagine 
working in a company with finer people. I feel I’m learning and growing and, most days, I’m 
having a lot of fun’ (P&GCA, 1996). By implying that working life embraces other areas of 
existence including relationships, emotion and play, executives expand their ‘scope for 
intervention in the human “lifeworld”’ beyond employment to the affective and ludic (Costea 
et al., 2006: 166; Fineman, 2006). In doing so, they ‘open up a present-future field of desire, 
promise and purpose that allows organizational members “to see themselves… as 
protagonists in some sort of progressive drama”’ (Carlsen, 2006: 146, cited in Ybema, 2010: 
486). The role of employees and managers as players in an ongoing drama is made explicit in 
the following statement by Pepper: 
Our place in Procter & Gamble’s history is now. I ask you to pause and try to bring to 
mind all the people who came before us. Some we know. Most we don’t. More than 
200,000 men and women have brought this Company to where it is today… This 
Company… has now been placed in the care of all of us… It is our turn to nurture and 
preserve it; revitalize it and build it to serve the next generation even better than it has 
served us. This is our responsibility and our opportunity. (P&GCA, 1996) 
 
Interpellated in this immediate yet personal way, organizational members are more likely to 
recognize themselves as belonging to a beloved institution, and play a role in the enactment 
of change.  
A limitation of this research concerns the small number of interviews undertaken with 
current and former P&G employees (Dellheim, 1986), whose views on downsizing and off 
shoring we were therefore unable to capture. The access we obtained at P&G headquarters in 
Cincinnati was to its historical archives for the purposes of data collection, rather than to 
conduct interviews with the workforce, which was not part of our agreed remit. However, we 
did conduct several interviews with current and former executives from P&G subsidiaries in 
other countries. Their views are revealing, confirming the moral purpose, uprightness and 
‘almost fanatical commitment to integrity’ at P&G, where stories were ‘part of the 
methodological mix’; but also that greater professionalism went hand-in-hand in the late 
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1990s with a lessening of warmth and friendship (Interviewee C, 2011). A valuable set of 
oral history interviews with former senior executives was obtained, whose personal accounts 
provide a first-hand window on the past (Feldman and Feldman, 2006). 
Our empirical analysis, we suggest, strongly refutes Weick’s (1995: 117) hypothesis 
that a superior organizational design would entail the removal of the top management team, 
in view of the potential for incomprehension which exists at the top due to the limits of sense-
giving imposed by the demands of interpellation (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). Bakken and 
Hernes (2006: 1605) note that Weick’s conception of executive power is open to challenge, 
being premised on his understanding that power is distributed consensually amongst groups, 
rather than concentrated at the top ‘through a priori commitments to norms and values’. We 
suggest that the experience of P&G offers powerful evidence against Weick’s proposition. 
Top managers may indeed be ‘constructed institutions’ (Creed et al., 2002: 480; Rowlinson 
and Hassard, 1993), promoted insiders called to ‘live up to the past’, rather than intentional 
creators of discourse in their own right. However, while interpellation does indeed constrain 
the ideological power of top executives, their relevance lies first and foremost in their 
abilities as storytellers and guardians of a collective heritage, achieved through the sequential 
‘multiauthoring of texts’ and their capacity to enact ‘strategy-as-story’, navigating by 
narration (Barry and Elmes, 1997: 446). As our empirical study demonstrates, this is a role in 
which top managers at P&G are well versed; in which they are, in the words of William 
Procter’s father to his son, ‘particularly able to guide those that come after’ (P&GCW, 
2012a). Weick acknowledges the importance of this role himself when recognizing the vital 
nature of storytelling and the substantiation of sensemaking this offers in terms of preserving 
a shared organizational legacy, which requires stewards to manage the process:  
‘Traditions, like paradigms, have exemplars and custodians (Shils, 1981, p. 13), 
stories and storytellers. It may seem like we are obsessed with stories. In a way that is 
true, but only because of the kind of data involved. Actions are fleeting, stories about 
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action are not… [W]e must be concerned with what persists when actions keep 
vanishing. That is a question involving the substance of sensemaking’. 
 
Once this is understood, it would be a considerable error to do away with top managers, even 
in the theoretical, tongue-in-cheek way that Weick proposes it. 
This article makes several contributions, which are interrelated. First, we contribute to 
the nascent but expanding literature which seeks to enrich organization studies by according 
it a longitudinal perspective, while bringing a narrative approach to business history research 
(Hansen, 2007; 2012; Kieser, 1994; Mills et al., 2013; Rowlinson et al., 2010; Rowlinson and 
Carter, 2002; Rowlinson and Hassard, 1993). We suggest that greater study of history is 
valuable to those who seek to better understand strategy, since historical narrative may help 
to address conflicting logics and overcome inertia (Barry and Elmes, 1997; Dellheim, 1986; 
Gioia et al, 2000; Reay and Hinings, 2009; Seo and Creed, 2002; Suddaby et al., 2010). 
Secondly, our study makes an important methodological contribution, being informed by 
extensive archival research, conspicuously lacking in organization studies (Harvey et al., 
2011a; Rowlinson and Carter, 2002). We add to the literature on time in organizations which 
links the past and the future in the context of organizational transition in an ongoing present 
(Bakken and Hernes, 2006; Bergson, 1911/2009; Carlsen, 2006; Schultz and Hernes, 2013; 
Tsoukas and Chia, 2002; Ybema, 2010). Organizational ideologies lend meaning to time and 
space (Brown and Humphreys, 2002; Meyer, 1982; Ricoeur, 1984). Our empirical analysis 
reveals that while organizational history is sometimes regarded as a strategic asset or as an 
intrinsic part of collective memory (Nissley and Casey, 2002; Rowlinson et al., 2010; Walsh 
and Ungson, 1991), it is also enacted as a common legacy, implying responsibilities. Thirdly, 
and most importantly, we make a particular contribution to the literature on historical 
storytelling by top managers. We build on the notion of rhetorical history advanced by 
Suddaby et al. (2010) to propose that historical narrative serves as a vehicle for ideological 
sensemaking by top executives, who draw on the interpellative power of rhetorical narrative 
 33 
to address conflicting systems of meaning and support their agendas for organizational 
transition in the present and future (Hansen, 2007; Parker, 2002; Pratt, 2000a; Rowlinson and 
Hassard, 1993; Seo and Creed, 2002; Suddaby et al., 2010). This brings together managers 
and employees as participants in an ongoing drama (Carlsen, 2006). Retrospective 
sensemaking through recourse to historical narrative facilitates prospective sensemaking at 
times of upheaval (Ybema, 2010), enabling actors to ‘reaccomplish actions that embody 
lessons learned by earlier generations’ (Weick, 1995: 126). We suggest that organizational 
memory, as conveyed through historical rhetoric, is endowed with a strategic, ideological 
function (Barry and Elmes, 1997; Costea et al., 2006), which assists with the ‘struggle for 
meaning’ in day-to-day organizational life (Bettelheim, 1975: 3). In this capacity, strong 
historical narratives may constitute a constraint as well as a resource, the exhortation to live 
up to the past becoming one of living up to the historical narrative (Hansen, 2007). In playing 
a role in the interpellation of organizational members, securing commitment to current 
objectives while negating potential counter-narratives, executives are themselves 
interpellated in turn as an intrinsic part of the process (Rennstam, 2012). 
Through skilful storytelling and adaptive sensemaking, ideology can be flexed and 
subtly refined in response to changing circumstances (Gioia et al., 2000). At P&G, ideology 
promotes an understanding of causality and how the past links to the future (Feldman and 
Feldman, 2006). Ideological sensemaking through historical narrative elicits the ongoing 
commitment of organizational members, who have a need to make sense of events. Although 
apparently taken for granted, ideology is constantly refreshed and recalibrated when needed, 
in this way remaining resilient during crisis and transition. 
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Appendix:  Research Material from P&G Archive 
 
Document Class Data Extracted 
Annual Reports, 
1930-2009 
 
 
Data relating to strategy discourse have been recorded in an 
annual digest for each year between 1930 and 2009, cross-
referenced to copies of the strategy sections of each annual report 
for the years between 1930 and 2009.  
Financial 
Statements, 1930-
2009 
 
 
Data from the audited annual accounts and notes to the accounts 
have been abstracted into a database covering each year between 
1930 and 2009. The data cover capital structure, sales revenues, 
cost of sales, expenditures on plant, R&D and advertising, 
distribution of sales and earnings by product category, and 
distribution of sales and earnings geographically.  
Organization 
Charts 
Organizational structure charts for 1955, 1966, 1974, 1989, 1996 
and 2001.  
Acquisitions, 
Divestments and 
Joint Ventures 
Details of all acquisitions, divestments and joint ventures entered 
into by P&G since 1980. 
Oral History 
Interviews 
 
 
Detailed oral history interviews conducted with senior 
executives: O.B. Butler, T.C. Bower, D.P. Fite and W.L. Lingle.  
Biographical 
Notes 
Biographical notes on the education, careers, corporate and non-
corporate networks of 38 senior executives appointed to the main 
board of P&G between 1945 and 2009: R.R. Deupree, H.G. 
French, F.M. Barnes, R.K. Brodie, C.J. Huff, N.H. McElroy, 
H.C. Knowles, T.J. Wood, R.F. Rogan, W.L. Lingle, H.J. 
Morgens, J.G. Pleasants, K.Y. Siddall, W. Rowell Chase, D.H. 
Robinson, E.A. Snow, J.M. Ewell, D.P. Fite,  W.R. Gurganus, 
J.W. Hanley, E.G. Harness, O.B. Butler, J.G. Smale, C.M. 
Fullgraf, T. Laco, J.W. Nethercott, E.L. Artzt, G.V. Dirvin, J.E. 
Pepper, D.S. Swanson, B. Jurgen Hintz, Durk I. Jager, G.F. 
Brunner, Harald Einsmann, A.G. Lafley, Brice L. Byrnes, R. 
Kerry Clark, Robert A. McDonald.  
Internal Executive 
Presentations 
Copies of 179 internal speeches together with accompanying 
notes and presentational slides when available of senior 
executives of P&G. 
Published 
Executive 
Speeches 
Copies of 24 speeches made to external audiences by P&G senior 
executives.  
Articles in 
Company 
Magazines 
Copies of 133 articles from company magazines published for 
most of the period under the title Moonbeams.  
P&G Fact Sheets Annual Fact Sheets  published by P&G from 1965 to 2006 
providing basic data on finance, top executives, organization, 
brands, manufacturing locations, corporate purpose, and foreign 
subsidiaries. P&G timeline ‘Building for the Future’, 2010. 
  
 
